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Abstract One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is true just in virtue of
its meaning is to observe that its truth is the subject of genuine disagreement. By
appealing to the case of the unorthodox philosopher, Timothy Williamson has recast
this response as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity. Reconciling
Quine’s epistemological holism with his treatment of the ‘deviant logician’, I show
that we may discharge the demands of charitable interpretation even while attributing
trivial semantic error to Williamson’s philosophers. Williamson’s effort to generalize
the argument from disagreement therefore fails.
Keywords Analyticity . Disagreement . Epistemological holism .Williamson,
Timothy . Quine, Willard Van Orman
One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is analytic, that is, is true just in
virtue of its meaning, is to observe that it has been the subject of disagreement. The
argument from disagreement is an elaboration of the paradox of analysis—the ancient
problem of how a statement can be both analytic and informative—and is a central
feature of contemporary debate in a variety of fields, notably metaethics,1 legal
philosophy,2 and philosophy of language.3
In his 2007 book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, and in contributions to a series of
subsequent symposia, Timothy Williamson recasts the argument from disagreement
as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity.4 To succeed, Williamson must
Acta Anal (2013) 28:345–352
DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0172-2
1See e.g., Frank Jackson (1998, pp. 139–62); (Schroeter and Schroeter 2009).
2Ronald Dworkin’s argument from legal disagreement remains the major objection to ‘social fact’ accounts
of the nature of law; e.g., Brian Leiter (2009); Scott Shapiro (2011 pp. 234–330).
3Saul Kripke’s famous Gödel and Jonah scenarios are the only instances of the argument from disagreement
that have begun to receive sustained empirical attention; see e.g., (Machery et al. 2004); (Systema and
Livengood 2011); Jonathan Ichikawa et al. (forthcoming).
4The argument is prefigured in Williamson (2006).
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resist the suggestion that disagreement concerning the truth of supposedly analytic
statements is trivial, the product of mere semantic or deductive error. He does so by
appealing to charity in the interpretation of possible repudiations of such statements.
Williamson argues that disagreements prompted by deviant philosophers rest on more
than mere trivial error. This does not exclude the possibility, however, that insofar as
such disagreements concern the truth of the repudiated statements, they do indeed rest
on such mistakes. The suggestion that any disagreement over the truth of the
supposed analyticities is trivial remains unanswered. The effort to dismiss the exis-
tence of analytic statements by demonstrating the ever present possibility of (non-
trivial) disagreement fails.
1 The Argument Recast
To establish that the truth of any statement is subject to disagreement, Williamson
tries to show that certain statements traditionally classified as paradigmatically
analytic are, or could be, rejected as false.5 Ostensibly, one such statement is P1, an
elucidation of the concept of negation:
(P1) There are no true contradictions.6
Though P1 is traditionally classified as analytic, it is prominently repudiated by
Graham Priest, who has asserted P2:
(P2) There are true contradictions, strictly so called.7
Given disagreement over supposedly paradigmatic analyticities such as P1, it seems
that the truth of any statement is subject to disagreement, which suggests that no
statement can true just in virtue of its meaning. Some have responded that Williamson’s
examples of the repudiation of supposed analyticities exhibit trivial semantic or deduc-
tive error.8 This response, Williamson believes, fails to do justice to the technical
expertise of the deviant philosopher. I will suggest, to the contrary, that Quine has
shown how we may acknowledge the expertise of the deviant philosopher, even while
attributing her repudiation of the truth of the relevant statement to trivial error.
2 A Trivially Mistaken Philosopher?
Williamson questions the plausibility of characterizing the deviant philosopher as
merely in need of semantic or deductive correction. While the resisted characterization
might indeed apply to some of Williamson’s notional deviants,9 to others, it does not:
5 Williamson (2007, pp. 85–130).
6 Id 126.
7 E.g., Graham Priest (1993).
8 See Adrian Moore (2009, pp. 124–25); Severin Schroeder (2009, pp. 83, 85–89); Hans–Johann Glock,
‘From Armchair to Reality’ (2010, pp. 343–44); Paul Boghossian (2010, pp. 494–95). Indeed, in his earlier
work on vagueness, Williamson was himself described as so characterizing Priest’s repudiation of P1:
Williamson (1992, pp. 146, 147 n 4) and Achille Varsi (2004, pp. 99–100) (responding).
9 See Schroeder id 85–89 (analyzing Williamson’s hypothetical repudiation of ‘Every vixen is a vixen’).
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If one had no idea who Graham Priest was and overheard him in a pub saying
‘There are true contradictions’, one might think at first that he was only saying
that because he misunderstood the long word ‘contradiction’. Once one starts
talking to him, that hypothesis feels rather less attractive.10
Here is a case where the repudiation of the supposed analyticity is accompanied by
an elaborate justification, one exhibiting serious philosophical reflection, ripe for
academic scrutiny and debate. Pub-goers would initially report that this man Priest
had misused the terms of his assertion, ‘There are true contradictions, strictly so
called’ (P2). Having listened to Priest’s argument, they would plausibly revisit their
assessment: no longer would Priest seem merely in need of consulting the pub
dictionary. Nevertheless, the unattractiveness of the hypothesis that Priest is asserting
P2 only because he misunderstood the word ‘contradiction’ does not settle whether
his assertion discloses a trivial error. To conclude that, charitably interpreted, Priest
expresses non-trivial disagreement with the truth of P1, we must avoid Quine’s
famous verdict on the deviant logician, that when he tries to deny the doctrine he
merely changes the subject.11
As later passages of his Philosophy of Logic make clear, Quine treats the deviant
logician as raising a serious question; that of whether the explanatory return of
replacing the established conceptual scheme outweighs the cost.12 By correcting
the deviant logician’s claim to express the literal truth while reviewing the explana-
tory value of the inherited scheme in light of his arguments, Quine shows how a
philosopher can be charitably interpreted even while being attributed a trivial seman-
tic error. The deviant’s philosophical expertise is acknowledged by the substitution of
a verdict of misuse of language with one of linguistic idiosyncrasy motivated by her
advocacy of the relative explanatory weakness of the conceptual apparatus elucidated
by the repudiated statement. By taking the deviant as a serious critic of that apparatus,
Quine discharges the demands of charitable interpretation, thereby contradicting the
suggestion that a philosopher’s repudiation of the truth of a statement cannot be
attributed to mere semantic error.
The relative plausibility of philosophers’ conflicting appeals to the meaning of,
say, ‘contradiction’, cannot be settled by reference to the general linguistic compe-
tence of philosophers relative to other language users.13 Faced with such conflicting
10 Williamson (2009, p. 134). Similarly, Williamson (2010, p. 499) ‘Once Simon has explained his view, it
is much less plausible that his unwillingness to infer [the statement ‘Booth shot Lincoln’] from [the
statement ‘Booth saw the balding Lincoln and shot him.’] manifests linguistic incompetence. It looks
much more like a case of theoretical disagreement.’; Williamson (2007, pp. 89–91) ‘[T]o stop our logical
debate with Peter and Stephen in order to explain to them what the word ‘every’ means would be irrelevant
and gratuitously patronizing.’.
11 Quine (1970, p. 81).
12 E.g., ‘[L]et us not underestimate the price of deviant logic. There is a serious loss of simplicity, especially
when the new logic is not even a many-valued truth functional logic… the price is perhaps not prohibitive,
but the returns had better be good.’ Id 86.
13 Williamson (2007, pp. 89–91) ‘[B]oth [deviants] have published widely in leading refereed journals of
philosophy, in English. They seem like most philosophers, thoroughly competent in their native language, a
bit odd in some of their views.’; Williamson (2009, pp. 134–35) ‘Moore allows that Priest may count as
using the words with their standard meanings “on a looser way of speaking”, but the case is utterly unlike
that of a language-learner whom it would be genuinely natural to describe as having only a partial
understanding of the words.’
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appeals,14 Williamson attributes the suggestion that the deviant is semantically
mistaken to philosophical dogma.15 Unfortunately, that explanation is, in principle,
equally applicable to Williamson’s exemplar deviants. Moreover, the reference to
philosophical dogmatism suggests that philosophers’ semantic intuitions may be less
reliable than those of others who are not invested in the success of semantic theories
or methodologies.
Elsewhere, Williamson and others argue that philosophers’ thought experimenta-
tion ought to be privileged over that of the folk.16 However this may be, sanguinity
that nonconformist philosophers always, ‘mean what we mean’ by their words seems
unjustified. We have long known of the risk that bias toward favoured theories may
affect our general processes of belief formation.17 Prima facie, that risk seems likely
to be more severe in the case of beliefs formed from a priori seemings than, say, those
formed from perceptions of scientific instruments. Recent work on semantic intu-
itions confirms the effect of philosophical bias.18 Accordingly, with respect to
semantic intuitions bearing on issues of theoretical significance to him, a philosopher
seems less likely than other language users to avoid semantic error. The mere fact that
a philosopher is ‘emphatic’ that he intends to use ‘with their standard English
senses’19 the words of a statement whose repudiation is a matter of theoretical
significance to him can thus do little to undermine the plausibility of a consensus
to the contrary. In the case of a deviant who repudiates a supposedly analytic
statement, the existence of such a consensus may be assumed.
3 Does Quinean Holism Imply that any Statement may be False?
Quine’s semantic correction of the deviant logician forms part of a charitable inter-
pretation because he is treated as a serious critic of the inherited conceptual scheme.
Quine’s interpretation depends, therefore, on his willingness to reject a statement, not
14 See the critics cited at n 8 above.
15 Williamson (2009, p. 135) ‘It is philosophical dogma, not respect for English, that prevents one from
seeing that Priest is as linguistically competent with the words as any other normal speaker of the
language.’
16 E.g., Williamson (2007, p. 191) ‘We should not regard philosophical training as an illegitimate
contamination of the data, any more than training natural scientists how to perform experiments properly
is a contamination of their data. Although the philosophically innocent may be free of various forms of
theoretical bias, just as the scientifically innocent are, that is not enough to confer special authority on
innocent judgment, given its characteristic sloppiness.’; Williamson (2011, p. 226) ‘[Sceptics offer] no
reason to rely less on trained philosophers’ skill at thought experimentation than on their [acknowledged]
skill at those other cognitive tasks [such as formal and informal argumentation].’ Similarly, Michael Devitt
(2011, p. 418) ‘Just as the intuitions of paleontologists, physicists, and psychologists in their respective
domains are likely to be better than those of the folk, so too the intuitions of the semanticists.’)
17 E.g., Dawson et al. (2002 p. 1385) ‘Faced with an unpalatable hypothesis, people tend to ask, in essence,
“Must I believe this?” rather than “Can I believe this?”’.
18 See Edouard Machery (forthcoming) ‘Theoretical commitments, which differ in different groups of
linguists, may sometimes influence their [semantic] intuitions, undermining the evidential role of these
intuitions.... [L]inguists in different fields respond differently to the Gödel case in ways that are a priori
predictable. Sociolinguists, historical linguists, and anthropological linguists, who are likely to be sensitive
to the descriptions associated with words, are more likely to have descriptivist intuitions than philosophers
of language and semanticists, who are likely to be familiar with Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.’
19 Williamson (2007) 89.
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because it is false, but because criticism reveals that the conceptual scheme it
elucidates is unsatisfactory in some other way. It is controversial whether the
epistemological holism expressed in ‘Two Dogmas’ is consistent with that
distinction:
Quine’s epistemological holism in ‘Two Dogmas’ undermines his notorious
later claim about the deviant logician’s predicament: ‘when he tries to deny the
doctrine he only changes the subject.’20
It is common ground that Quine’s critique of the elusiveness of a satisfactory
explanation of analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ is independent of its expression of a form
of epistemological holism.21 But Williamson is not alone in interpreting Quine’s
holism as itself contradicting the claim that some statements are true just in virtue of
meaning.22 The interpretation is encouraged by some suggestive remarks in ‘Two
Dogmas’ itself.23
The question is whether we are to take the contents of our system of knowledge to
be determined solely by how we distribute truth values over statements. Granted that
any revision of the system redistributes truth values over the relevant statements, the
revisability of every element of the system entails that no statement can be true just in
virtue of its meaning. Likewise, if every revision redistributes truth values, philo-
sophical advocacy of a particular revision could not motivate a trivially mistaken
repudiation of the truth of a relevant statement. However, an alternative interpretation
is available according to which the contents of our system of knowledge are not
determined solely by how we distribute truth values:
Science is a continuation of common sense… The edge of the system must be
kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its elaborate myths or fictions,
has as its objective the simplicity of laws.24
So formulated, Quine’s holism is consistent with our practice of assessing scien-
tific hypotheses on a different footing to the conceptual apparatus with which they are
framed. Whereas we may treat, ‘the conceptual scheme of science as a, tool, ulti-
mately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience’,25 it need not
be thought to respond to experience in the manner of the hypotheses it serves to
frame.
Conceptual schemes, no less than hypotheses, may be revised to improve our
prediction of future experience. Likewise, they may be taken as epistemologically
20 Williamson id 97 (citing Quine (1970, p. 81)).
21 Williamson himself rejects the critique; Williamson (2007) 50, ‘“Two Dogmas of Empiricism” does not
explain why we should regard the undefined terms of semantics as worse off than the undefined terms of
other disciplines, except by dogmatic charges of unclarity. After all, semantics is now a thriving branch of
empirical linguistics. It is not to be trashed without very good reason.’
22 So too do critics of Williamson’s argument from disagreement; see e.g., Schroder (2009, pp. 84–85);
Hans–Johann Glock (1996, p. 209–10).
23 See e.g., Willard Van Orman Quine (1951, p. 40) ‘[Given holism] it becomes folly to seek a boundary
between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold
come what may.’
24 Id. 42.
25 Quine (1951, p. 41).
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equivalent to hypotheses inasmuch as each can be retained, ‘come what may’.26 As
Quine observed, however, standards of rationality enter into the question of which
revisions are to be made.27 Whereas disconfirming experience will tend to prompt
revision of a hypothesis, revision of a conceptual scheme might be thought to be
prompted, not by disconfirming experience, but rather by gains in the simplicity with
which hypotheses may be formulated. If the epistemic considerations guiding our
revisions diverge in this way, a redistribution of truth values need not be understood
to accompany every revision, in which case, in contrast to discarded hypotheses,
statements elucidating discarded concepts need not characterized as false. The po-
tential for any statement to lose its place in the system would not imply that no
statement is true just in virtue of its meaning.
Quine himself seems not to anticipate a redistribution of truth values in his
example of the introduction of irrational numbers, omitted from later reprints:
Imagine, for the sake of analogy, that we are given the rational numbers. We
develop an algebraic theory for reasoning about them, but we find it inconve-
niently complex, because certain functions such as square root lack values for
some arguments. Then it is discovered that the rules of our algebra can be much
simplified by conceptually augmenting our ontology with some mythical enti-
ties, to be called irrational numbers. All we continue to be really interested in,
first and last, are rational numbers; but we find that we can commonly get from
one law about rational numbers to another much more quickly and simply by
pretending that the irrational numbers are there too.28
Quine’s characterization of the historical decision to extend the number
system dovetails neatly with his own consideration of the merit of adopting
deviant logics.29 Take the statement, ‘The set of numbers is countable’. The state-
ment partially elucidates the conceptual scheme underpinning our original algebraic
theory, i.e., the rational numbers. Revising that scheme by introducing a further,
uncountable set of numbers simplifies mathematics, and, ultimately, improves our
tools of prediction. Yet it would be odd to say that recognition of the explanatory
gains contingent on the extension of the number system falsified the statement, ‘The
set of numbers is countable’. Certainly, that would be contrary to Quine’s own
description of the development. Understandings introduced by simply pretending
that something is the case, bench, rather than falsify, the understandings that they
displace. In contrast, revision of a scientific hypothesis or observation invariably
occurs on foot of its apparent falsification; a disparity reflected in Quine’s description
of the statement, ‘Brutus killed Caesar’, as one which, ‘would be false if the world
had been different in certain ways’.30
26 ‘Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the
system.’ Id 40.
27 ‘[T]he considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory
promptings are, where rational, pragmatic.’ Id 43.
28 Id 41. ‘I think this a fair account of the introduction of irrational numbers and other extensions of the
number system.’ Ibid.
29 See comments cited at n. 12, above.
30 Id 34 (emphasis added).
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The holism expressed in ‘Two Dogmas’ plausibly respects a common sense
distinction between the grounds for revising conceptual schemes and those for
revising scientific hypotheses. If revision by falsification is the preserve of the latter,
Quinean holism remains consistent with the possibility of truth just in virtue of
meaning. Moreover, the suggested interpretation has the advantage of consistency
with Quine’s discussion of the deviant logician, which, by assessing the explanatory
virtue of the inherited scheme in light of the deviant’s arguments, succeeds in
reconciling the principle of interpretive charity with the attribution of trivial semantic
error. Indeed, the suggested epistemology appears consistent with Priest’s most recent
characterization of his own project:
[B]y forcing philosophers to struggle to find arguments for what previously was
an undisputed belief, namely the one in the Law of Non-Contradiction, diale-
theism would have rendered a valuable service to philosophy even if it turned
out that it is ultimately wrong.31
A suite of sophisticated arguments might convince us that we ought to abandon the
Law of Non-Contradiction, but would hardly reveal that, in fact, there had been true
contradictions all along. Quine would recognize Priest’s explicit willingness – once
all the arguments are in – to concede that we in fact ought to retain classical logic as a
natural consequence of their shared holism. So would Williamson’s pub-goers.
4 Conclusion
Drawing on the principle of interpretive charity, Williamson resists the suggestion
that disagreement concerning the truth of supposedly analytic statements is trivial, the
product of mere semantic or deductive error. However, true to his epistemological
holism, Quine’s treatment of the deviant logician offers a clear example of how the
demands of charity may be consistent with the attribution of trivial semantic error.
The force of the example is buttressed by the growing wariness of philosophical bias
in semantic intuitions, which provides reason to discount the deviant’s insistence that
his use of language is indeed standard. In the result, Williamson’s effort to generalize
the argument from disagreement into a critique of the very possibility of analyticity
fails to show that genuine disagreement is always possible.
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